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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the district court's order withholding judgment

entered following Appellant Lawrence Lutton's conditional guilty plea, by which he
reserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. R.
103-110.

B.

General Course of Proceedings
On May 23, 2014, Mr. Lutton and his two sons (a four-year-old and a two-

year old) went to Arrowrock Reservoir to enjoy a day of fishing and playing in the
water with two friends and their children. Exhibit A, 1 10:48-12:00, 20:38-23:00,
21:35-21:50; Tr. p. 89, ln. 5-20. At about 9:00 p.m., the friend drove Mr. Lutton to
his two-wheel drive vehicle and Mr. Lutton followed his friend down the windy dirt
road towards the highway. Exhibit A, 12:12-12:25; Tr. p. 89, ln. 21-p. 90, In. 1.
As Mr. Lutton traveled about a quarter mile behind his friend to avoid the
worst of the dust, he hit washboard and lost control of his vehicle, which left the
road and fell into the reservoir. Exhibit A, 12:09-12:34;19:48-20:00; Tr. p. 90, In. 2-9.
Mr. Lutton escaped the submerging vehicle and rescued his four-year-old son. Tr. p.
90, In. 10-15. The four-year-old was not breathing when he was removed from the
water and the friend revived him with CPR. Exhibit A, 12:34-13:13. Meanwhile, Mr.

1 Exhibit A is an audio recording of a Boise City Police Officer's interactions with
Mr. Lutton and his friend. The Idaho State Police trooper who actually seized Mr.
Lutton's blood failed to record his interactions with Mr. Lutton.
1

Lutton lost his two-year-old son after unbuckling him from his seat and spent the
next half hour or more diving into the cold water trying to find him. Exhibit A,
12:34-13:40; Tr. p. 38, ln. 24 - p. 39, ln. 7; p. 90, ln. 15-21. The friend and others
who had stopped to help eventually forced Mr. Lutton out of the water and
convinced him that he and the four-year-old needed treatment for hypothermia.
Exhibit A, 13:04-13:30, 20:00-21:00, 22:40-23:00; Tr. p. 90, ln. 19-24.
The friend drove Mr. Lutton and his four-year-old towards Saint Luke's
Hospital in Boise while others on the scene continued to search for the two-year old.
Tr. p. 39, ln. 12-15; p. 90, ln. 3-11. Two Boise City Police officers observed the friend
driving west on Warm Springs Avenue at a high rate of speed with the vehicle's
hazard lights flashing. Tr. p. 34, ln. 17 -p. 36, ln. 1; p. 66, ln. 1-12. The officers
stopped the friend's vehicle and one officer approached Mr. Lutton in the passenger
seat while the second contacted the friend in the driver's seat. Tr. p. 36, ln. 2-p. 37,
ln. 3.
The officer who spoke with Mr. Lutton at the passenger window detected the
"slight odor of intoxicating beverage coming from the vehicle" as she spoke with Mr.
Lutton. Tr. p. 37 ln. 4-6; p. 46, ln. 21- p. 47, ln. 4. Mr. Lutton informed the officer
that he had consumed three beers between one and three o'clock that afternoon and
the driver also admitted drinking earlier in the day. Tr. p. 37, In. 10-12; p. 51, In. 519. The officers called an ambulance to transport Mr. Lutton and his four-year-old
child to the hospital and, since the accident occurred in Boise County, asked
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dispatch to send an Idaho State Police trooper to the hospital in order to investigate
whether Mr. Lutton had been driving under the influence. Tr. p. 40, ln. 3 - p. 41, ln.
2; p. 50, ln. 2-11.
The second officer interviewed Mr. Lutton in the ambulance and noted that
he was unable to smell any alcohol on his person. Tr. p. 67, ln. 1- p. 68, ln. 2; p. 69,
ln. 17 -p. 70, ln. 7. The officers remained on the scene and interviewed Mr. Lutton's
friend about the accident before traveling to the hospital. Exhibit A, 10:48-13:40; Tr.
p. 70, ln. 13-22.

The officers then went to the emergency room ("ER") and entered Mr.
Lutton's treatment room as he emotionally related to the friends at his bedside that
he "couldn't find [his two-year-old son] anywhere." Exhibit A, 18:40-19:10; Tr. p. 41,
ln. 16 -p. 42, ln. 4; p. 70, ln. 20-25. The officer told Mr. Lutton's friends that she
needed to talk to Mr. Lutton and was "going to have you guys here leave." Exhibit
A, 19:10-19:40.
The officer spent "quite a bit of time" speaking directly with Mr. Lutton, who
was naked except for a blanket, in the small hospital ER treatment room about his
activities earlier in the day and the accident. Tr. p. 19, ln. 7-14; p. 42, ln. 15-21; p.
49, ln. 2-21; p. 71, ln. 1-6; p. 84, ln. 15-19. Mr. Lutton explained that he drank three
cans of beer between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. Exhibit A, 20:50-21:40. The officer
neither detected the odor of alcohol on Mr. Lutton nor noticed any indication that
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Mr. Lutton was impaired or intoxicated. Tr. p. 42, ln. 15-21; p. 49, ln. 2-21, p. 52, ln.
3-5.
The officer explained to Mr. Lutton that an Idaho State Police trooper was en
route to read him a form and take his blood. Exhibit A, 22:00-22:15. According to
the officer, she did not conduct the standardized field sobriety tests ("FSTs") herself
because "we were waiting for ISP at that point. We were turning [the DUI
investigation] over to them. Tr. p. 50, ln. 8-22; p. 59, ln. 7-20. The officer told Mr.
Lutton that since he had admitted drinking and there were injuries, the officer
would read a form to take blood and "then we will get a phlebotomist in here."
Exhibit A, 22-10-22:30; Tr. p. 55, ln. 20-25. The trooper arrived and the city officer
briefed him, including telling him that she smelled alcohol on the friend. Tr. p. 16,
ln. 1-7; p. 31, ln. 13-22; p. 43, ln. 3-11. The city officers then posted themselves just
outside Mr. Lutton's room. Tr. p. 43, ln. 12-25; p. 80, ln. 1-17.
Hospital staff entered the room to obtain verbal consent for medical
treatment and Mr. Lutton's permission for he and his four-year-old son to have
visitors. Exhibit A, 23:30-24:15. Another employee told Mr. Lutton that his sister
had arrived to see him and w bile she knew he could not have visitors at the
moment, inquired whether Mr. Lutton wanted visitors when the officer was "done."
Tr. p. 24:20-25:00.
The trooper briefly interviewed Mr. Lutton about the accident and his
drinking earlier in the day before reading the ALS advisory form. Exhibit A, 26: 11-
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26:30. The trooper was trained to conduct FSTs but did not "investigate a DUL" Tr.
p. 10, ln. 4- p. 12, ln. 15; p. 17, ln. 24- p. 18, ln. 1. Instead, the trooper relied on
someone else as to whether there was probable cause to believe Mr. Lutton was
impaired, trusted "the officers on scene that had made that call already'' and
believed he was being dispatched solely to obtain the blood sample. Tr. p. 12, ln. 9p. 13, ln. 5; p. 18, ln. 6

p. 19, ln. 6; p. 28, ln. 9-12. The trooper told Mr. Lutton that

he "would have to submit to a blood test" because he admitted to drinking and there
had been a significant accident. Tr. p. 21, ln. 2-6. Mr. Lutton remained in the room
with the trooper for about thirty to forty-five minutes before a nurse arrived to draw
his blood. Tr. p. 22, ln. 5-7.
Before the blood draw, a gurney carrying Mr. Lutton's two-year old child
passed in the hallway in front of Mr. Lutton with a trauma team working on him.
Tr. p. 8, ln. 6-12; p. 22, ln. 20-p. 23, ln. 3; p. 57, ln. 7-23. Mr. Lutton became
distraught as his child was wheeled by and began to cry. Tr. p. 23, ln. 4-8. Mr.
Lutton wanted to see his son and the trooper told him that he would get Mr. Lutton
to his son "as soon as we can." Tr. p. 23, ln. 16-24. The child was placed in the
adjoining room, which was divided from Mr. Lutton by a transparent partition. Tr.
p. 6, ln. 14-21.
The hospital chaplain followed the two-year-old to the treatment room and
noticed Mr. Lutton, who was wrapped in a blanket in the adjacent room, become
"very, very" upset and start crying when his child passed on the gurney. Tr. p. 79,
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ln. 9-p. 80, ln. 1. Tr. p. 80, ln. 1-9. The chaplain observed the trooper inside Mr.
Lutton's room and the two officers posted outside. Tr. p. 80, ln. 12-21. The chaplain
believed Mr. Lutton was being detained by police and thus did not attempt to take
him to the two-year-old at that time. Tr. p. 82, In. 16-21. The chaplain instead went
to the four-year-old's room and checked in with the friends and family there. Tr. p.
82, ln. 22-25.
"Total chaos" followed the child's arrival in the adjoining room. Tr. p. 8, In.
15-18; p. 19, 17-18; p. 32, ln. 1-19; p. 57, ln. 7-10. While the trooper testified that he
did not deny Mr. Lutton permission to go to his child, the trooper was uncertain
whether he actually poked his head out of the room to get permission for Mr. Lutton
to go to his child or whether he asked one of the other officers. Tr. p. 32, In. 1-13.

The trooper clarified that believed he did "something" in effort to obtain permission
for Mr. Lutton but had no specific recollection as to exactly what he did. Tr. p. 32,
In. 13-25. The trooper also did not know whether he told Mr. Lutton "he's fine;
they're taking care of him; you have to do the blood draw first." Tr. p. 25, ln. 2-4.
As the trauma team treated his two-year-old son in the adjacent room, the
trooper informed Mr. Lutton "you need to give blood" to which Mr. Lutton
responded "okay." Tr. p. 25, ln. 8-14. After the police ohtained Mr. Lutton's blood,
the chaplain returned to the room, got Mr. Lutton dressed and took him to see his
sons. Tr. p. 84, ln. 15 - p. 85, ln. 20. The two-year-old later succumbed to his
injuries. See R. 15-16.
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The laboratory analysis indicated that Mr. Lutton's blood alcohol
concentration was .092 and the state charged him with vehicular manslaughter and
DUI. R. 15-16. Mr. Lutton moved to suppress the blood test results, arguing that
the blood draw was not justified by any recognized exception to the warrant
requirement and violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. R. 26-36. Following a hearing, the state argued the blood
draw was authorized by consent and probable cause. R. 43-49.
The district court found probable cause that Mr. Lutton had committed
vehicular manslaughter based on his admission to drinking three beers nine to
twelve hours before the accident; the officer's detection of the odor of alcohol
emanating from the vehicle; and the officers' knowledge Mr. Lutton lost control of
his vehicle and crashed into the reservoir, which could possibly result in a fatality.
R. 70-71. The district court further found that Mr. Lutton did not resist the blood

draw and, thus, did not revoke his implied consent. R. 73-74. The district court thus
denied Mr. Lutton's motion to suppress. R. 75. Mr. Lutton moved to reconsider,
noting the district court's findings were unsupported by the evidence and it had
erroneously concluded that consent authorized the seizure. R. 77-89.
Mr. Lutton thereafter pied guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of
his motion to suppress. R. 78-80, 90-91. The district court withheld judgment and
placed Mr. Lutton on unsupervised probation for four years. R. 103-106. This appeal
follows.
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III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the district court error in denying motion to suppress?

IV. ARGUMENT
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures. An evidentiary test measuring blood alcohol
content ("BAC test") is a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416,

418, 337 P.3d 575, 577 (2014). Just as with other warrantless seizures, a
warrantless BAC test violates these state and federal constitutional guarantees
unless the state establishes application of a well-recognized exception to the
warrant requirement by a preponderance of the evidence. Missouri v. McNeely, 133
S.Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013); Wulff, 157 Idaho at 419, 337 P.3d at 578. Under McNeely,
Idaho can neither treat exigency based upon the natural dissipation of alcohol in
the bloodstream nor the implied consent statute as per se exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Wulff, 157 Idaho at 419-20, 337 P.3d at 578-79.
Here, the district court found that police lawfully seized Mr. Lutton's blood
pursuant to Idaho's implied consent statute. However, an Idaho driver implicitly
consents to a BAC test only where police have reasonable grounds to believe he or
she is driving under the influence. Here, neither the city officers nor the trooper
conducted a DUI investigation as each agency believed the other was responsible to
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do so. The available facts - no signs of impairment, no alcoholic odor on Mr.
Lutton's person, and Mr. Lutton's admission to drinking three beers more than nine
hours before an accident - fall well short of forming the requisite level of cause.
Even if police had reasonable grounds to request an evidentiary test, any consent
was nc, longer voluntary at the time Mr. Lutton's blood was seized.
Accordingly, the district court erred in concluding that implied consent
justified the blood draw and in denying Mr. Lutton's motion to suppress. This Court
should therefore vacate the district court's order withholding judgment and allow
Mr. Lutton to withdraw his guilty plea.
A.

Standard of Review
On appeal from a motion to suppress, this Court accepts the trial court's

findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence, while freely reviewing the
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Case, 159
Idaho 546, 363 P.3d 868, 870-71 (Ct. App. 2015); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559,
561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). The reasonableness of a given search or
seizure is a question of law requiring this Court's independent review. State v.

Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562, 112 P.3d 848, 850 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Parkinson,
135 Idaho 357, 360, 17 P.3d 301, 304 (Ct. App. 2000).

B.

Idaho's Implied Consent Statute Did Not Justify the Blood Draw
Because the Trooper Lacked Reasonable Grounds to Believe Mr.
Lutton Drove Under the Influence
Idaho Code § 18-8002(1) provides that a motorist who operates a vehicle in
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Idaho implicitly consents to evidentiary testing, provided that the police officer has
"reasonable grounds" to believe the motorist is intoxicated. Wulff, 157 Idaho at 419,
337 P.3d at 578; Wernecke v. State, Idaho Transp. Dep 't, 158 Idaho 654, 658, 350
P.3d 1031, 1035 (Ct. App. 2015), review denied (July 2, 2015). "Reasonable grounds"
is not defined by statute and the Idaho Court of Appeals has interpreted Idaho
Supreme Court precedent as unclear as to whether an officer needs probable cause
to have "reasonable grounds" to request the BAC test. State v. Nicolescu, 156 Idaho
287, 290, 323 P.3d 1248, 1251 (Ct. App. 2014).
Nevertheless, cases in which the appellate court found "reasonable grounds"
include evidence of intoxication beyond the circumstances present in this case. For
instance, in Wernecke, the officer detected a strong odor of alcohol and observed that
the driver's eyes were glassy and bloodshot, that he had slurred speech and an
impaired memory. Wernecke, 158 Idaho at 659, 350 P.3d at 1036. The driver also
failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, repeatedly failed to follow the officer's
instructions as he administered the test and admitted he consumed alcohol earlier
that evening. Id. These circumstances provided the police officer with legal cause to
believe the driver had been under the influence of alcohol and to administer BAC
test. Id.; see also State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03, 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007)

overruled on other grounds by Wulff (reasonable grounds to suspect that defendant
was driving under the influence included erratic driving, bloodshot and glassy eyes,
and slurred speech); State v. Orr, 157 Idaho 206, 209, 335 P.3d 51, 54 (Ct. App.
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2014) (defendant properly detained on suspicion of driving under the influence
where officer found defendant in the driver's seat of his vehicle; was unable to wake
defendant by knocking on the vehicle window; ultimately shook the defendant in
order to rouse him; observed slurred speech, glassy and bloodshot eyes, and breath
smelling of alcohol; and noted the defendant had impaired memory and poor
judgment); Nicolescu, 156 Idaho at 291, 323 P.3d at 1252 (reasonable grounds to
administer BAC test because officer questioning the defendant detected a strong
odor of an alcoholic beverage; observed that his eyes were red, bloodshot, and
watery; and the defendant informed the officer that he had been consuming alcohol
earlier that evening); In re Suspension of Driver's License of Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937,
943-44, 155 P.3d 1176, 1182-83 (Ct. App. 2006) (reasonable grounds where driver
was weaving, officer smelled alcohol inside vehicle and on his person, defendant's
eyes were blood shot and the defendant admitted to drinking two beers after
initially denying any consumption of alcohol).
Conversely, in the instant case, no officer noted that Mr. Lutton had
bloodshot eyes, impaired memory, or other indication of intoxication. As noted by
the district court, Mr. Lutton "understood and responded to questioning at the
hospital." R. 74. The city officers did not conduct a

ou; investigation at the traffic

stop because Mr. Lutton and his four-year-old son needed medical attention. They
did not conduct FSTs at the hospital because they believed they were turning their
investigation over to the ISP trooper. The trooper, on the other hand, understood his
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sole purpose was to obtain the blood sample and believed other officers had already
conducted the investigation. In short, unlike cases where a driver's admission to
minimal drinking was coupled with signs of impairment, Mr. Lutton's presentation
was entirely consistent with his statement that he had stopped drinking more than
six hours before the accident.
In finding probable cause, the district court considered that one city officer
smelled alcohol when she first contacted Mr. Lutton at the passenger window of the
friend's vehicle. R. 70. However, neither officer smelled alcohol on Mr. Lutton's
person - either in the confined space of the ambulance minutes later or during

direct interaction in the small ER treatment room. Unlike a situation in which the
suspect provides innocent explanations for suspicious circumstances, the officers

own oLservations established that the "slight" odor the officer detected at the
window must have come from the passenger who admitted drinking. Cf. State v.
Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 411, 283 P.3d 722, 728 (2012) (the existence of alternative

innocent explanations does not necessarily negate reasonable suspicion).
The sole grounds to believe Mr. Lutton could have been under the influence
at the time of the accident was his statement he had three beers more than nine
hours before the accident and the fact he lost control on a dirt road's washboard
surface. Those facts do not establish reasonable grounds without evidence of actual
impairment.
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The district court noted that the officers knew Mr. Lutton had lost control "of
his vehicle which crashed into the reservoir, and that there was reason to believe
that there would be a fatality." R. 70. However, the seriousness of the potential
offense does not lower the standard needed to find reasonable grounds to ask a
driver to submit to a BAC test.2
Nor does the bare existence of an accident equate a driving pattern
evidencing impairment. The friend informed officers that Mr. Lutton was driving
his two-wheel drive vehicle about a quarter of a mile behind the friend to avoid the
dust when the friend saw Mr. Lutton's headlights leave the road. Exhibit A, 20:20.
Mr. Lutton told the officers that he lost control on washboard, overcorrected and
went off the road. Exhibit A, 20:30. That Mr. Lutton lost control on a narrow dirt
road after hitting washboard while driving a two-wheel drive vehicle at dusk
certainly does not establish reasonable grounds to believe he was driving
intoxicated, even if driving off an ordinary road could in itself establish
impairment. 3

2 Conversely, the offense's seriousness is relevant to whether exigent circumstances
justified a warrantless blood draw. The state did not present any evidence that
exigent circumstances justified the failure to obtain a warrant in this case.
3 The particular stretch of road on which Mr. Lutton lost control is notorious for its
treacherous nature. On June 22, 2015, the Idaho Statesman reported an accident
involving "the 10th person to have died since 2009 after running off Arrowrock
Road, which narrows into a windy, rutted dirt road about 5 miles east of Idaho 21."
http://www.idahostatesman.com/news/local/article40865439.html#storylink=cpy.
The articles noted that the "body was found less than a mile east of the site where a
car went off the road and into the reservoir in May 2014, resulting in the eventual
13

Neither the city officers nor the trooper conducted a DUI investigation and
the circumstances fall well short of establishing reasonable grounds to request a
BAC test. Accordingly, the implicit consent statute cannot justify the blood draw
and the district court should have suppressed its results as fruit of the poisonous
tree.

C.

Even if the BAC Request was Supported by Reasonable Grounds, Mr.
Lutton Did Not Continue to Provide Voluntary Consent to the Blood
Draw and the Search and Seizure Cannot Be Upheld Based on
Implied Consent
Implied consent is no longer acceptable when it operates as a per se exception

to the warrant requirement. Wulff, 157 Idaho at 421, 337 P.3d at 580. Thus, implied
consent may justify a warrantless blood draw only when (1) the driver gave his or
her initial consent voluntarily, and (2) the driver continued to give voluntary
consent at the time of evidentiary testing. State v. Rios, No. 43017, 2016 WL
1638043, at *2 (Idaho Apr. 26, 2016); Wulff, 157 Idaho 423, 337 P.3d 575, 337 P.3d
at 582. A defendant's refusal, protest or objection to the BAC test terminates the
implied consent given under Idaho's implied consent statute. Rios, No. 43017, 2016
WL 1638043, at *2; State v. Eversole, No. 43277, 2016 WL 1296185, at *5 (Apr. 4,
2016); State v. Smith, 159 Idaho 15, 26, 355 P.3d 644, 655 (Ct. App. 2015), rev.

denied (Aug. 18, 2015).
Here, the district court erroneously concluded that Mr. Lutton had to

death of' Mr. Lutton's 2-year-old son. Id. "Most recently, a Boise couple ... died on
Valentine's Day (2015] when their car plunged into Arrowrock Reservoir. Id.
14

unequivocally revoke implied consent and incorrectly equated Mr. Lutton's
acquiescence to the trooper's indication he "needed to give blood" with voluntary
consent. Mr. Lutton had suffered both emotional and physical trauma and Mr.
Lutton could not have visitors until the officers were finished. At the time of the
actual blood draw, Mr. Lutton was distraught as a trauma team worked on his twoyear-old in plain view and he was told to wait before going to his son. The totality of
these circumstances establish that Mr. Lutton's capacity for self-determination was
critically impaired and that he no longer voluntarily consented to the test at the
time his blood was seized. The district court therefore erred in denying Mr. Lutton's
motion to suppress.
1.

The district court failed to consider whether the totality of the
circumstances established that Mr. Lutton continued to
voluntarily consent to the blood draw

The district court reasoned "it is clear that the driver must unequivocally,
based upon the totality of the circumstances, demonstrate that he or she is
withdrawing the implied consent provided by statute" and that "the evidence is
clear that that Lutton did not affirmatively object, refuse or physically resist the
request for blood draw." R. 72, 74. However, rather than requiring a suspect to
"unequivocally" revoke consent, the "standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's
conser.t under the Fourth Amendment is that of 'objective' reasonableness' - what
would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the
officer and the suspect?" Rios, No. 43017, 2016 WL 1638043, at *2, citing Florida v.
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Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991).
Here, the city officers arrived in Mr. Lutton's treatment room and evicted his
friends. Exhibit A, 18:45-19:40. After Mr. Lutton answered the officer's questions, a
nurse let him know his sister had arrived to see him and inquired whether he
wanted visitors once the officer was finished. Exhibit A, 24:20-25. Mr. Lutton
indicated that he did. Id. Both the city officer and the trooper informed Mr. Lutton
that his blood would be seized because there had been a significant accident and he
had been drinking. Tr. p. 21, ln. 2-6; p. 55, ln. 20-25. Before the blood draw, Mr.
Lutton's two-year-old son arrived gravely injured and a trauma team treated him in
plain view. Mr. Lutton asked to see his son and the trooper told him to wait. The
officer then told Mr. Lutton "you need to give blood." Tr. p. 25, ln. 8-14.
The typical person in such a situation would have understood that he was
obligated to have his blood drawn and that he would be allowed to see his sons and
friends once that blood draw was complete. Mr. Lutton no longer voluntarily
consented when his blood was taken regardless of whether the trooper used the
word "mandatory" or expressly told Mr. Lutton he could not see his son until the
blood draw.
Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court "has never stated that verbal or physical
resistance was required to withdraw implied consent." Rios, No. 43017, 2016 WL
1638043, at *3. Mere acquiescence to a claim of authority by a law enforcement
officer does not constitute consent. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 549, 88
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S.Ct. 1788, 1792, 20 L.Ed.2d 797, 802-03 (1968); Sims v. State, 159 Idaho 249, 358
P.3d 810, 816 (Ct. App. 2015), review denied (Nov. 4, 2015).
That Mr. Lutton was cooperative and did not say "no" to the blood draw fails
to e~tablish that he continued to voluntarily consent to the blood draw. Instead,
especially given Mr. Lutton's extreme vulnerability and the coercive circumstances,
his lack of resistance establishes mere acquiescence, not voluntary consent. See

also State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481, 485 (Ct. App. 2006)
(defendant's nod in response to the request for permission to open the box was
evidence only of consent, not proof of its voluntariness, and such minimal
affirmative gestures may indicate mere acquiescence); State v. Zapp, 108 Idaho 723,
726, 701 P.2d 671, 67 4 (Ct. App. 1985) (defendant detained in coercive atmosphere
when searched and in such circumstances mere acquiescence, such as a shrug of the
shoulders or a minimal affirmative gesture, does not constitute consent under the
Fourth Amendment).
Mr. Lutton was not required to unequivocally revoke his implied consent or
expressly refuse the blood draw by saying "no." Rather, the issue is whether the
totality of the circumstances establish that Mr. Lutton continued to voluntarily
consent to the BAC test at the time his blood was taken.

2.

Mr. Lutton's characteristics and the circumstances
surrounding the blood draw fail to establish voluntary consent

"Where the validity of a search rests on consent," the state must prove "that
the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given."
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Rios, No. 43017, 2016 WL 1638043, at *2, citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497
(1983). Courts assess "the totality of all the surrounding circumstances -both the
characterietics of the accused and the details of the interrogation" to determine
whether a subject's will was overborne in a particular case. Jaborra, 143 Idaho at
97, 137 P.3d at 484, citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
This factual determination must account for subtly coercive police questions and the
possibly vulnerable subjective condition of the party giving consent. Jaborra, 143
Idaho at 97, 137 P.3d at 484. Supreme Court decisions determining whether a
suspect's consent was voluntary or coerced "each reflected a careful scrutiny of all
the surrounding circumstances" and "none of them turned on the presence or
absence of a single controlling criterion." Wulff, 157 Idaho at 422, 337 P.3d at 581

citing Schneckloth, 412 at 226.
Officers found Mr. Lutton covered only by a blanket in an ER treatment room
waiting with his friends for news of his two-year old who had been submerged in the
water for more than thirty minutes. The officers evicted Mr. Lutton's friends, and
informed Mr. Lutton that a trooper would arrive to read him a form and take his
blood. After the trooper arrived, the other two officers posted themselves at the
door. Tr. p. 20, ln. 2-22. Hospital staff confirmed that he wanted visitors once
officers were finished and he was allowed. Exhibit A, 23:40-25:00.
Shortly before the blood draw, a gurney carrying Mr. Lutton's two-year old
child passed in the hallway and entered the adjoining room, which was divided by a
\
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transparent partition. Tr. p. 8, In. 6-16; p. 22, In. 20-p. 23, In. 3. Mr. Lutton
became distraught 4 as his child was wheeled by and began to cry. Tr. p. 23, In. 4-8
Tr. p. 80, In. 1-9. He wanted to see his son and the trooper told him that he would
get him to his son "as soon as we can." Tr. p. 23, In. 16-24.

It is hard to imagine circumstances more likely to evoke a vulnerable
emotional condition and to interfere with the capacity for self-determination than
those encountered by Mr. Lutton. Mr. Lutton did not voluntarily consent to the
blood draw and the district court should have granted the motion to suppress.

3.

The circumstances described in the officers' testimony would
have communicated to the typical reasonable person that the
blood draw was obligatory and needed to be complete before
Mr. Lutton could see his sons, family and friends

The district court indicated that it did not find Mr. Lutton credible when "he
testified that he was told that he could not refuse and that the blood draw was
mande.tory" or when he testified "he was told repeatedly that that he could not see
his son unless he provided a blood sample." R. 74. The district court indicated it
instead credited the trooper's testimony on those points. Id.
Nonetheless, the typical person in Mr. Lawrence's situation - as described in
the trooper's testimony and the testimony of the other two officers - would have

4 Relying on the audio recording of the city officer's contact with Mr. Lutton at the
hospital, the district court found that: "while [Mr. Lutton] was certainly and
understandably upset and concerned throughout, [he] was in much better condition
at the hospital than he was at the time of the traffic stop." R. 74. Whatever Mr.
Lutton's emotional state when speaking with the city officers, the trooper and the
chaplain both described Mr. Lutton as distraught and crying when his two-year-old
19

believed the blood test was mandatory and that he could see his sons and have
other visitors after the trooper had obtained his blood.
While the trooper denied saying the word "mandatory" in reference to the
blood draw, he also did not ask whether Mr. Lutton consented. Tr. p. 25, ln. 11-14.
Consent is not voluntary if it is "the product of duress or coercion, express or

implied." Wulff, 157 Idaho at 422, 337 P.3d at 581, citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
227 (emphasis added). The trooper testified that he told Mr. Lutton that he "would
have to submit to a blood test" and "you need to give blood" - phrases
communicating that Mr. Lutton's consent was immaterial. Tr. p. 21, ln. 3-6; p. 25,
ln. 8-14. A typical person -particularly one in Mr. Lutton's vulnerable state - would
have understood he had no choice but to submit to the blood draw.
The only communication that possibly suggestec! a choice was the ALS
advisory, which describes the civil penalty for refusing. The ALS advisory does not
communic?.te that the suspect can decline to cooperate with the officer's direction to
submit to a BAC test. Indeed, in the years between Diaz and McNeely, officers
played the advisory notwithstanding the fact that a driver's refusal to provide a
breath sample simply resulted in a blood draw, taken with physical force when
necessary.
After playing the advisory, the trooper told Mr. Lutton "you need to give
blood." Tr. p. 25, ln. 8-14. Mr. Lutton reasonably believed that he was required to

arrived in the adjacent room before the actual blood draw.
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submit to a blood draw. See also State v. Butler, 302 P.3d 609, 614 (Arizona 2013)
(court did not abuse its discretion in finding consent involuntary where officer read
the implied consent admonition verbatim and and in "plain English" before
concluding with the statement, "You are, therefore, required to submit to the
specified tests").
The circumstances also communicated that Mr. Lutton could not see his son
or other family or friends until the blood draw was complete. At the time the gurney
carrying Mr. Lutton's two-year old child passed, he hart already been told he was
not allowed visits from friends or family until the officers were finished with him.

See Exhibit A, 20:20. According to the trooper, Mr. Lutton was distraught, crying
and wanted to go to his son. Tr. p. 23, ln. 4-16. The trooper testified that he told Mr.
Lutton that he would get Mr. Lutton to his son "as soon as we can." Tr. p. 23, ln. 1624.
Indeed, rather than contradict Mr. Lutton's testimony that the trooper told
him he had to give blood before seeing his child, the trooper testified that he was

uncertain whether he told Mr. Lutton "he's fine; they're taking care of him; you have
to do the blood draw first." Tr. p. 25, ln. 2-4. And while the trooper denied refusing
to allow Mr. Lutton to have contact with his son, he could not recall whether he
actually poked his head out of the room to see whether Mr. Lutton could go to his
child or whether he asked one of the other officers. Tr. p. 8, ln. 2-5; p. 32, ln. 1-19.

21

The trooper described the situation as "total chaos" in which he thought he "did
something but can't remember what." Tr. p. 32, In. 14-19.
Further, the pertinent inquiry is not whether the officers subjectively
intended to communicate to Mr. Lutton that could not go to his child until he gave
blood but, rather, what the typical reasonable person would have understood by the
exchange between the officer and Mr. Lutton. While the trooper may have believed
that the "call" whether to allow Mr. Lutton to see his son was the hospital's instead
of his [Tr. p. 24, In. 7-15], the evidence establishes that the hospital staff was
keeping Mr. Lutton from family and friends because of the police presence. See
Exhibit A, 18:45-19:30 (officer evicting friends from room), 23:30-24:10 (staff
indicating she would finish registration later and confirming he wanted visitors),
24:15-25:00 (second staff informing Mr. Lutton his sister had arrived to see him and
confirming he wanted family to visit once the officer was finished); p. 81, In. 16 - p.
82, In. 25 (chaplain's testimony that she did not go to Mr. Lutton and unite him
with family because she believed he was being "held" by police). It was thus entirely
reasonable for Mr. Lutton to believe that he could not go to his sons until the police
had finished their investigation by seizing his blood.
The circumstances described in the officers' testimony and reflected on the
audio recording establish that Mr. Lutton was informed he could not see friends or
family until law enforcement gave permission. The officers further indicated to Mr.
Lutton that they would take his blood and that he "needed" to give the officer his

22

blood. Shortly before the actual blood draw, Mr. Lutton's gravely injured two-yearold arrived and the trooper told Mr. Lutton he had to wait to see him. Particularly
in light of Mr. Lutton's extremely vulnerable subjective condition, his cooperation
during the blood draw does not establish voluntary consent. The district court erred
in finding that Mr. Lutton voluntarily consented to the blood draw.

V. CONCLUSION
The district court erred in determining that the officers had reasonable
grounds to believe that Mr. Lutton had been driving under the influence. Even if
there were sufficient grounds to request a BAC test, Mr. Lutton did not continue to
voluntarily consent at the time his blood was seized. The district court erred in
denying the motion to suppress and Mr. Lutton respectfully asks this Court to
vacate the district court's order withholding judgment and remand with instruction
to allow Mr. Lutton to withdraw his guilty plea.
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of June, 2016.

Robyn Fyffe
Attorney for Lawrence Lutton

23

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on June 1, 2016, I sent a copy of the foregoing to the
Criminal Law Division of the Idaho Attorney General at ecf@ag.idaho.gov

Robyn Fyffe

24

